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Abstract
In a real options model, we show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes
directly to investment timing. Thus, when a ￿rm undertaking a project requires an outside
supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing
but uncertain demand, and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an
industry standpoint. The distortion in ￿rm decisions is characterized by a Lerner-type index, and
we show how market growth rate and volatility a⁄ect the extent of the distortion. If the initial
market demand is high, greater volatility increases the e⁄ective investment cost, and results in
lower value for both ￿rms. Vertical restraints can restore e¢ ciency. For instance, the upstream
￿rm can induce entry at the correct investment threshold by selling a call option on the input.
Otherwise, if two downstream ￿rms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream ￿rm sells the
input to the ￿rst investor at a discount which is chosen in such a way that the race to preempt
exactly o⁄sets the vertical distortion, and this leader invests at the optimal time.
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11 Introduction
In real option models of investment, the cost of the investment (strike price) is often tacitly taken
to re￿ ect economic fundamentals closely. This assumption seems reasonable when the investment
consists of R&D that is performed largely in-house, or in industries such as real estate development
that may rely on competitive outside contractors. However, there are many other cases in which
a ￿rm wishing to exercise an investment option depends on an outside ￿rm with market power to
provide it with a discrete input (e.g., a key equipment) it needs to start producing and selling.
Thus, an electricity producer may buy a nuclear plant from an outside ￿rm, an oil company that
decides to drill o⁄shore must acquire a platform from a specialized supplier, or an aeronautics ￿rm
will coordinate aircraft development with an engine manufacturer. In addition, strategic issues may
arise if several ￿rms seek to exercise related investment options, and call upon the same supplier.
To illustrate, in the next section we outline the case of a market for a new vaccine, where demand is
related to the di⁄usion of an emerging pathogen, and ￿rms must invest in a factory constructed to
exact speci￿cations before starting operations.
This paper uses advances in real options games to build a model of vertical relationships in
which the cost of a ￿rm￿ s investment is endogenous.1 We adopt similar speci￿cations to models
by Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1], Mason and Weeds [16], and Smit and Trigeorgis [20], and
incorporate an upstream equipment supplier that prices with market power. There are thus two
ways to approach the contributions of this paper. On the one hand, it extends the real options
literature, including strategic real options game, to encompass a richer industrial structure, and on
the other, the paper shows how insights drawn from the study of vertical relationships apply in
stochastic dynamic settings.
Speci￿cally, we show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships translates directly to in-
vestment timing, with investment trigger replacing price as the decision variable of the downstream
￿rm. When the upstream supplier exercises market power, a vertical e⁄ect akin to double marginal-
ization causes the downstream ￿rm to unduly delay its investment decision relative to the optimal
1For recent surveys of game theoretic real options models, see Boyer, Gravel, and Lasserre [2], and Huisman, Kort,
Pawlina, and Thijssen [12]. Among economic extensions of real option models, Grenadier and Wang [11] comes closest
to our work here, as it studies the e⁄ect of agency issues on option exercise (albeit, in a corporate governance frame-
work). Moreover, Lambrecht, Pawlina, and Teixeira [14] and Patel and Zavodov [17] develop alternative approaches to
investment options in vertical structures.
2exercise threshold for the industry. This distortion increases with both market growth and volatility.
Thus, the industry earns lower pro￿ts under separation than under integration. In contrast with the
standard real option framework, greater volatility decreases upstream and downstream ￿rm value
near the exercise threshold, because of the simultaneous presence of two e⁄ects: the option value of
delay is balanced by a greater markup choice by the upstream ￿rm.
If feasible (for example, because the upstream ￿rm has information regarding the stochastic ￿nal
demand), vertical restraints that take the form of an option or down payment restore the industry
optimum. Without vertical restraints, the upstream ￿rm bene￿ts from the presence of a second
downstream ￿rm, although this possibly occurs at the expense of aggregate industry pro￿ts. We ￿nd
that the race between downstream ￿rms to preempt one another exactly balances the incentive to
delay caused by the upstream ￿rm￿ s mark-up, so the leader invests at the optimal integrated threshold
(as in the integrated case with a single buyer), whereas the follower invests at the separation threshold
(for duopoly pro￿ts), a type of ￿no distortion at the top￿result. The leader receives a discounted
price, and this discount decreases when the volatility rises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate the analysis, and
our model speci￿cations, by examining the case of an emerging market for a new vaccine. In Section
3 we describe the model, with one upstream supplier and one downstream ￿rm, and investigate the
basic vertical externality. This is done by comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the integrated case,
which we use as a benchmark, with the outcomes of the separated case. In Section 4, we discuss the
introduction of vertical restraints that restore the industry optimum. In Section 5, we introduce a
second downstream ￿rm and compute the preemption equilibrium, before comparing the investment
threshold and pricing outcomes with the single-￿rm case. Final remarks appear in Section 6. All the
proofs and derivations are in the appendix.
2 An Example: Investments in the Vaccine Industry
A recent example of investment in production facilities for a new vaccine against the dengue fever
motivates our model. Dengue is a disease caused by any of four closely related virus serotypes
transmitted by mosquitoes. It strikes people with low levels of immunity, with symptoms that
include intense joint and muscle pain, headache, nausea, and fever. The most severe form of the
disease is the dengue hemorrhagic fever. Although it occurs mostly in Asian and Latin American
countries, where it is a leading cause of hospitalization, the disease spreads to new parts of the globe
3each year, including countries such as Australia and the United States (Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, the Texas-Mexico border, Paci￿c islands, and most recently Florida).2
To address this problem, one or more vaccines are due to arrive over the next years. With
clinical studies reaching their ￿nal phase, Sano￿ Pasteur, the vaccines division of Sano￿ Aventis
SA, was the ￿rst to launch the construction of a new plant north of Lyon (France) in 2009, with
an annual capacity of 100 million doses per year. The total investment amounts to $477 million
(see Carroll [3]). The main facility, which concentrates the ￿rm￿ s production technology, has been
speci￿cally designed for the processing of the novel vaccine. Most components of the investment,
including fees and wages, capital amortization, and the costs for the safety and quality quali￿cation
procedure, are unrecoverable. The equipment is sourced on an intermediate market from specialized
input providers, and represents on the order of 35-40% of the plant construction cost. The customized
lyophilisators, which use liquid nitrogen refrigeration for freeze drying operations, constitute a central
piece of equipment in the mass production process. The suppliers of pharma freeze drying technology
are highly concentrated, suggesting the possibility of market power. In Europe, lyophilizators are
supplied by ￿rms such as Usifroid, a subsidiary of Telstar SA which recently claimed a French
market share of 80% in freeze drying equipment solutions for the pharmaceutical industry. In 2009,
GlaxoSmithKline Plc (GSK), another leading vaccine producer, announced that it would develop
and manufacture another dengue vaccine with a Brazilian partner. GSK is thus likely to also invest
in additional production capacities in the foreseeable future, at some point in time that will depend
on demand forecasts.3
The potential demand for the future vaccines is clearly growing, though future levels are uncer-
tain. The number of reported cases, as measured annually, is a simple indicator of the magnitude
of future demand.4 According to the World Health Organization (WHO) ￿[a]n estimated 2.5 billion
people live in over 100 endemic countries and areas where dengue viruses can be transmitted. Up
to 50 million infections occur annually with 500,000 cases of dengue hemorrhagic fever and 22,000
deaths mainly among children￿ . The number of countries reporting cases is another demand indi-
cator. The WHO indicates that ￿[p]rior to 1970, only 9 countries had experienced cases of dengue
hemorrhagic fever; since then the number has increased more than 4-fold and continues to rise￿ .5
2See World Health Organization [22] and Center for Disease Control [4].
3Sources on Telstar￿ s market shares in Europe and GSK￿ s project to manufacture a vaccine for dengue fever are
http://www.telstar-lifesciences.com/en/ and http://www.gsk.com/media/pressreleases/2009, respectively.
4The issue of demand forecasts for new vaccines is discussed thoroughly in Center for Global Development [5].
5Source: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/dengue/impact/en/index.html.
4This real-world situation, where ￿rms￿choice of investment timing depends on the cost of a key
equipment, which is necessary in order to serve a growing though uncertain demand, and is delivered
by an upstream supplier with market power, is thus emblematic of the many market cases captured
by our model speci￿cations, which are described in the next section.
3 The Basic Vertical Externality
Investment in a discrete input is necessary to operate on a ￿nal market. It can be produced and used
by the same ￿rm (integration), or produced by an upstream supplier and used by one or several other
￿rms (separation). The ￿ ow pro￿t resulting from investment is Yt￿M where ￿M is an instantaneous
monopoly pro￿t, and Yt > 0 is a random shock assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
with drift dYt = ￿Ytdt + ￿YtdZt. The non-negative parameters ￿ and ￿ represent the market￿ s
expected growth rate (or ￿drift￿ ) and volatility, respectively, and Zt is a standard Wiener process.6
A lowercase y = Yt is used to denote the current level of the state variable. The threshold yi is
a decision variable. It triggers the investment (whence the subscript i) in the discrete input when
attained by Yt for the ￿rst time and from below, at a future date which is stochastic. The cost I of
the input is positive. The discount rate r > ￿ is common to all ￿rms.7
3.1 Integrated Case
Suppose that a single ￿rm produces the discrete input, decides at what threshold yi to invest, for a
current market size y ￿ yi, and earns the subsequent ￿ ow pro￿t. The value of a ￿rm that decides to


















￿2, which is referred to in what follows as a discounting term.
The expressions of V (y;yi;I) in (1), and of ￿, are standard in real option models (see Dixit and








by using It￿￿ s lemma.
7It can be proved easily that a ￿rm increases value by waiting to invest forever if r ￿ ￿.
5Pindyck [7], Chapter 5, or Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [6], Chapters 11-12).8 We will use the
property that ￿ is decreasing in ￿ and in ￿ throughout the paper.
The integrated ￿rm￿ s decision problem is maxyi V (y;yi;I). Since the objective is quasiconcave,
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It is assumed throughout that the current market size y at t = 0 is positive and su¢ ciently small
relative to I so that it is not pro￿table to invest immediately.
3.2 Separated Case
Suppose that the input production and investment decisions are made by distinct ￿rms. We suppose
that the upstream ￿rm, as an input producer on the intermediate market, does not observe Yt at
(almost) any date t.9 As a separate entity, it chooses an input price pS ￿ I that is independent of the
random shock. The downstream ￿rm is assumed to be a price-taker in the intermediate market.10
Given pS, it observes the ￿nal market shock, and decides when to invest, at yi. To establish the
equilibrium in (yi;pS) we proceed by backwards induction.
The value of a downstream ￿rm that decides to invest when the market reaches size yi, given the











all y ￿ yi. The separated ￿rm￿ s decision problem is maxyi V (y;yi;pS), and the associated value-










in (1) reads as the expected discounted value, measured when Yt = y, of receiving one monetary









the standard continuous time discounting term.
9We relax this assumption only in Section 4 which discusses possible vertical restraints.
10As in Tirole [21], this is ￿for simplicity￿only that we ￿assume that the manufacturer chooses the contract￿(p.
173), and the outside option of the downstream ￿rm is normalized to zero.






(pS ￿ I), (4)
all y ￿ yS. Given yS (pS), the upstream ￿rm￿ s decision problem is maxpS W (y;pS), leading to the
optimal price which is to set p￿
S =
￿













































￿￿1, implying that V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S) > W (y;p￿
S), all ￿ > 1.


















. Hence the industry value
is lower under separation than under integration, as is to be expected.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In the separated case, the upstream ￿rm introduces a distortion by charging a price pS above the
cost I. This is analogous to the baseline model of vertical externality11, the investment trigger
substituting for the ￿nal price as the downstream decision variable.
In fact, this model is formally identical to the baseline model with price choices, a ￿nal demand
Q = aP￿b, a constant marginal cost of production c, and a wholesale price w, taking P ￿ yi,
a ￿ ￿M
r￿￿y￿, b ￿ ￿, c ￿ r￿￿
￿M I, w ￿ pS
r￿￿
￿M .




￿￿1y￿, is greater than in the integrated case. In static models of oligopoly, the Lerner










11See Tirole [21] for a description.
7Formally, ￿ plays the same role as the (absolute value of) the elasticity of demand in a monopoly
model. By analogy, although it does not represent a price-cost margin, one may de￿ne a measure of










Note from (7) and (8) that Lp and Ly are fully characterized by ￿, and are impacted in the













￿￿1 which implies that, in the separated case, the relative ￿rm value is decreasing in ￿, as is
the distortion in the two ￿rms￿decisions vis-￿-vis the integrated case. The two measures Lp and Ly
behave similarly and converge to 0 when ￿ tends to in￿nity.















. In contrast with the distortion in upstream and down-




















= 1 (recall that ￿ is
decreasing in ￿ and ￿).13 This is because factors other than the vertical externality also a⁄ect ￿rm
values, including the denominator V (y;y￿;I). When a rising ￿ or ￿ make ￿ relatively low, the
impact of the vertical distortion is small relative to the real option e⁄ect, and the joint value under
separation converges to the value under integration. To summarize:
Proposition 2 The industry value is lower under separation than under integration. The distortion
in ￿rm decisions, as measured by Lp and Ly, is increasing in market growth rate and volatility,
whereas the distortion in separated and integrated payo⁄s is decreasing in market growth rate and
volatility.
For the sensitivity analysis of ￿rm choices and values we consider changes in the growth rate and
in the volatility parameter separately.
￿ Growth. The e⁄ect on y￿
S and p￿









12These expressions are comparable to those in Dixit, Pindyck, and Słdal [8].










8A change in these parameters does not impact only the magnitude of the vertical externality, as
there is also a real option e⁄ect. To see that, focus ￿rst on the upstream ￿rm￿ s value. For notational
simplicity, let V ￿ ￿ V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S). By the envelope theorem, @V
@y￿






































which is positive for all y ￿ y￿
S. The direct e⁄ect in (9) is positive. The two terms between
brackets, which describe the indirect e⁄ect, have opposite signs because a higher growth rate increases
the investment option￿ s value, but simultaneously raises the input price. However, the magnitude
of the latter term is limited, so that the option value e⁄ect dominates the vertical e⁄ect. The
sensitivity analysis is similar for the upstream ￿rm, whose value in equilibrium W￿ ￿ W (y;p￿
S) has
an analogous form. Speci￿cally, the e⁄ect of greater market growth on upstream value is univocal,















> 0 (see Appendix 7.4), so in elasticity terms





Figure 1: Downstream value V ￿ = V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S), for y ￿ y￿
S, with r￿￿
￿M = I = 1, r = 0:2, ￿ = 0:05 and
￿1> ￿2> ￿3 such that ￿(￿1) = 2 (solid), ￿(￿2) = 2:5 (dash), ￿(￿3) = 3:5 (dots). For large initial market
sizes, greater uncertainty (i.e., a lower ￿) reduces ￿rm value.
￿ Volatility. The e⁄ect on y￿
S and p￿









However, the e⁄ect of volatility on ￿rm values is not univocal. Taking ￿rst the case of upstream
value, and noting again that @V
@y￿




































￿ ^ y (note that ^ y is lower than y￿
S for all
￿ > 1). A change in ￿ has two opposite indirect e⁄ects on V ￿. The ￿rst term between parentheses
in (10) is the real option e⁄ect: greater volatility (hence a lower ￿) has a positive impact on the
downstream value. The second term is the vertical e⁄ect: greater volatility raises the upstream
￿rm￿ s optimal price p￿
S, lowering the downstream value. The net e⁄ect depends, in particular, on the
current market size y. At low market sizes, the real option e⁄ect dominates and the downstream ￿rm
bene￿ts from greater volatility, whereas at higher market sizes, which are closer to the investment
trigger y￿
S, the real option e⁄ect is less important and the vertical e⁄ect tends to dominate. For
large initial market sizes, in this model greater uncertainty thus reduces ￿rm value, which stands in




for several levels of ￿.











d￿, the crossover occurs at a lower threshold than for the upstream ￿rm,






￿ ￿ y < ^ y. Thus, both ￿rms bene￿t from greater volatility at low enough
market sizes, and both are harmed by volatility at high enough market sizes, and there exists a range
of market sizes (￿ y; ^ y) over which the two ￿rms have divergent preferences with respect to volatility.
The following proposition summarizes these results, making use of the inherent elasticity form
in expressions such as (9) and (10).
Proposition 3 In the separated case, a higher growth rate or more volatility increase the upstream
price and the downstream trigger. A higher growth rate increases upstream and downstream values,
with 0 < "W￿=￿ < "V ￿=￿. The e⁄ect of higher volatility on ￿rm values depends on the market size:
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 ￿ "W￿=￿ < "V ￿=￿ if y ￿ ￿ y;
"W￿=￿ < 0 < "V ￿=￿ if ￿ y < y < ^ y;
"W￿=￿ < "V ￿=￿ ￿ 0 if ￿ y ￿ y:
104 Vertical Restraints
In the baseline model of vertical externality, various contracting options or vertical restraints allow
the separated structure to realize the integrated pro￿t. Similar mechanisms apply here, although
the interpretation is di⁄erent because of the underlying dynamic nature of the model. We illustrate
them by means of two examples.14
In Figure 2, the dashed line is the locus of the downstream ￿rm￿ s optimal responses to given
upstream prices, yS (pS). With the chosen parameters (that is, ￿ = 2 and I = ￿M
r￿￿ = 1), the
separation outcome of Section 3.2 is (y￿
S;p￿
S) = (4;2). For a given y below the benchmark trigger
y￿ = 2, we may graph the isovalue curves of both ￿rms in the plane (yi;pS). The convex curves
are the upstream isovalues, whereas the downstream isovalue curves are concave. The ordering
of the curves follows from the monotonicity of the value functions V and W in pS. Because p￿
S
maximizes W (y;pS), the point (y￿
S;p￿
S) lies at a tangency of an upstream isovalue with the locus






16, whereas the integrated value is V (1;y￿;I) = 1
4.
The two ￿rms can be made better o⁄ by reaching a contractual agreement that yields a greater
total value than in (1), the equilibrium of the separated case. The most direct value-maximizing
contract speci￿es both the investment trigger and the price. This is analogous to resale price main-
tenance in the standard vertical framework. For simplicity, assume that the upstream manufacturer
chooses the contract, and proposes it to the other ￿rm, at some given y ￿ y￿.
The contract proposal must satisfy the constraints that the downstream buyer earns no less
than in the separation outcome with no vertical restraint. Should the upstream ￿rm￿ s current o⁄er
be rejected by the downstream ￿rm, the upstream ￿rm could not credibly commit not to sell the
speci￿c input at p￿
S at a future date when the trigger y￿
S is reached. It follows that the downstream
￿rm￿ s reservation value is V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S). The upstream ￿rm can appropriate all bene￿ts on top of the
latter downstream reservation level by dictating the trigger y￿, so that the total industry value is
maximized, before charging the price for which the downstream participation constraint is exactly
satis￿ed.
14Note though that certain contractual arrangements, such as a maintenance contract, may not have bearing on the
vertical externality. In the present model the distortion in investment timing arises because there is a mark-up on the
overall cost of the input. It is independent of how this investment expense is allocated in time.
11Formally, for any y ￿ y￿, and by slightly abusing notation15 to introduce yi as an argument of




s.t. pS ￿ pS (yi); (11a)
pS ￿ p
S (yi): (11b)
It is clear from Figure 2 that the ￿rst constraint is equivalent to V (y;yi;pS) ￿ V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S), and
the second one to W (y;yi;pS) ￿ W (y;y￿
S;p￿
S), with p








, and pS (yi) by V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S) = V (y;yi;pS (yi)). Total value maximization implies
that yi = y￿, and the upstream supplier maximizes its share of total value by charging pS = pS (y￿),
so that (11a) is exactly satis￿ed. With the parameter values that we use in our example (￿ = 2,
y = I = ￿M
r￿￿ = 1), the two participation constraints reduce to 5
4 ￿ pS ￿ 3
2, and the input supplier
chooses yi = y￿ = 2 and pS = pS (2) = 3
2.16
Proposition 4 Suppose that y ￿ y￿. In a contract analogous to resale price maintenance, the
upstream ￿rm chooses the investment trigger y￿ and charges the input price pS (y￿), as de￿ned by
V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S) = V (y;y￿;pS (y￿)). The downstream value is the same as in the separation outcome,
and the upstream value is W (y;y￿;pS (y￿)) > W (y;y￿
S;p￿
S).
One caveat is that the implementation of this contract requires the upstream ￿rm to continuously
monitor y until the market size reaches y￿, which may be costly. This was not needed in the separated
case, with no vertical restraint. Nor is it clear that y￿ is an easily veri￿able contract provision, or
that such contracts are used in practice.





(pS ￿ I), all y ￿ yi.
16The constraints (11a-11b) are compatible whenever p




results from continuity of V (y;yi;pS) and W (y;yi;pS) in yi and pS, together with V (y;yi;pS) being monotone
increasing in yi on [y
￿;y
￿
D], and decreasing in pS, whereas W (y;yi;pS) is monotone decreasing in yi, and increasing in
pS. Obviously, the participation constraint of the input supplier, who writes the contract, can be omitted. However,













Figure 2: Upstream and downstream isovalues (￿ = 2, y = I = ￿M
r￿￿ = 1). Point A describes the separated
equilibrium, the upstream ￿rm charges p￿
S = 2, and the downstream ￿rm enters at y￿
S = 4. Points B and C
describe joint-value maximizing contracts, as chosen by the upstream ￿rm under the constraint that the
downstream ￿rm earns no less than V ￿ = 1
8. In both contracts the upstream ￿rm chooses the investment
level y￿ = 2. In B, the input price is 3
2, and in C it is I, so that the upstream supplier takes no margin. In
the latter case the supplier can sell an up-front option with strike I and specify a transfer payment t￿
S = 1
8,
resulting in a downstream value V (1;y￿;I) equal to the reservation level V ￿ = 1
8.
A contractual alternative is to set the equivalent of a two-part tari⁄. In this case, for any y ￿ y￿,
the integrated value is realized by means of an up-front option o⁄ered to the downstream ￿rm on the
speci￿c input at an exercise price, pS.17 We know from Section 3.2 that the input buyer maximizes
its private value by exercising the option when Yt reaches the barrier yS (pS). As in the previous
contractual example, the objective of the upstream supplier is to induce the choice of the e¢ cient
investment trigger by the input buyer, and to appropriate the value in excess of the downstream
reservation level V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S). This can be done through a transfer payment, tS, made at y, which
we interpret here as the option premium. This contract also corresponds to a non-refundable deposit
on the speci￿c input.
17Airlines typically buy options to purchase planes conditioned on air tra¢ c volumes.
13The upstream problem is then:
max
pS;tS
W (y;pS) + tS
s.t. V (y;yS (pS);pS) ￿ tS ￿ V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S); (12a)
W (y;pS) + tS ￿ W (y;p￿
S): (12b)
With the joint-value maximizing input price p￿
S = I, the downstream ￿rm chooses to invest when
Yt = yS (I) = y￿. The transfer payment is chosen under the condition that the downstream ￿rm￿ s
participation constraint is exactly satis￿ed.18 With the same parameter values as in Figure 2, (12a)
and (12b) reduce to 1
16 ￿ tS ￿ 1
8, the downstream ￿rm invests at yS (1) = y￿ = 2, hence the upstream
￿rm chooses tS = t￿
S(1) = 1
8, as paid by the downstream ￿rm when the market size is y = 1.
Proposition 5 Suppose that y ￿ y￿. In a contract analogous to a two-part tari⁄, the upstream ￿rm
charges the price I, and chooses the transfer t￿
S(y) = V (y;y￿;I) ￿ V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S). The downstream
value is the same as in the separation outcome, and the upstream value is W (y;I)+t￿
S(y) > W (y;p￿
S).
This kind of contract imposes a smaller informational requirement on the upstream ￿rm than
the previous one, although it does require it to have an estimate of the current market size y at the
date at which the option is written.
If the contracting alternatives, as described in this section, are not available to the upstream
￿rm, the presence of a downstream ￿rm may act as a substitute. As it results in earlier investment,
the race to preempt downstream counteracts the ￿double marginalization￿distortion, at least for
the ￿rst ￿rm that invests.
5 Downstream Duopoly
In this section the structural assumptions are those of Section 3, except that on the intermediate
market the upstream ￿rm faces two downstream buyers, that also compete on the ￿nal market. We









which always holds if pS = I. As in the case of the previous vertical restraint, the participation constraint of the
upstream ￿rm, which writes the contract, can be omitted. We keep it here in order to describe the range of possible
transfer payments when the bargaining power is less asymmetrically distributed.
14build on the analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole [9] (preemption), Grenadier [10], Mason and Weeds
[16], and Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux [1] (preemption under uncertainty).19 Now Yt describes an
industry-wide shock, so that the ￿ ow pro￿ts are Yt￿M (monopoly) if a single ￿rm has entered the
￿nal market, and Yt￿D (duopoly pro￿ts) if both ￿rms have invested, with ￿D < ￿M.
The upstream ￿rm is constrained to a single instrument, the spot price of the speci￿c input, but
it may charge di⁄erent prices at di⁄erent dates (intertemporal price discrimination). It may thus
condition the spot price on the information it receives regarding the demand of downstream ￿rms (in
particular, how many ￿rms are present). In what follows pL denotes the spot price charged to the
￿rst ￿rm to invest (the ￿leader￿ ), and pF denotes the spot price for the second ￿rm (the ￿follower￿ ).
We also assume that the upstream supplier cannot make commitments at one date regarding prices
at some future date.
In the absence of strong positive technological externalities at the downstream stage (if total
duopoly pro￿ts are lower than monopoly pro￿ts), the integrated optimum from the industry￿ s view-
point is for a single downstream ￿rm to be active. However, in the separated case, and in the absence
of su¢ cient other instruments, we have seen that the downstream ￿rm invests too late. Therefore
the upstream ￿rm may ￿nd it pro￿table to allow a second ￿rm into the market. Then the race to
preempt downstream, as it typically results in earlier investment, can counteract the ￿double mar-
ginalization￿distortion, and thereby functions as a substitute for the vertical restraints examined in
Section 4.20
5.1 Equilibrium
The underlying strategies of the downstream ￿rms are the ￿simple￿ mixed strategies de￿ned in
Fudenberg and Tirole [9], which consist of (augmented) distributions of investment thresholds, con-
ditional on the number of downstream ￿rms to have already invested.21 In order to determine the
equilibrium, it su¢ ces to determine two investment triggers, yP and yF, at which the leader and the
follower invest, respectively. In equilibrium, the identity of the leader and follower are indeterminate,
19A comprehensive discussion of these contributions can be found in Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [6].
20If an exclusive dealing clause is allowed, an upstream ￿rm that is able to implement resale price maintenance
or price the downstream option contract can potentially use the threat of downstream duopoly, altering the terms
discussed in Section 4: it o⁄ers the downstream ￿rm exclusivity but bene￿ts from a lower reservation value which
corresponds to the ex-ante downstream value in a preemption equilibrium, as displayed in (21).
21See also Huisman, Kort, and Thijssen [13].
15in that either ￿rm e⁄ectively invests ￿rst, with equal probability. The follower trigger results from
standard arguments: once the leader has invested, the subgame between the upstream ￿rm and the
follower is identical to that in Section 3.2.
In what follows, when the current market size is y, the value of a follower that invests at a






















￿D I. Compared with
the case where the speci￿c input is produced internally (Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux [1], Mason
and Weeds [16]), the follower invests at a level of y that is
￿







Remark 1 F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F) does not depend on (pL;yP).
Indeed, what the ￿rm takes into account when it chooses an investment trigger, as a follower, is
the pro￿t ￿ ow it may expect in the future. This ￿ ow is not impacted by the investment cost of the
leader, nor by its exact investment date.
To determine the preemption threshold yP, given pL, it is necessary to refer to the value of a
￿rm that invests immediately at the current market size y, given that its rival invests optimally as a
follower. Let L(y;pL) denote this value, which has a di⁄erent form from the V (￿) expressions is the













Although this function is commonly used in preemption models, it is also useful to consider a more


















F;pL) measures the value, at the current market size y, of a ￿rm that is free
to invest at yL as a leader.22 We have L(y;pL) = ~ L(y;yL;yF;pL) when the constraint yL ￿ y is
imposed, and yF = y￿
F:
Remark 2 argmaxyL ~ L(y;yL;y￿
F;I) = fy￿g:
22See Reinganum [18].
16In other words, when it incurs the ￿true￿cost of investment pL = I, a ￿rm that is free to choose
yL invests at the same date as in the integrated case (with a single ￿rm). This is another illustration
of the ￿myopic￿behavior as coined by Leahy [15].
The analysis of the investment game based on the functions (13) and (14) closely follows that
of existing models. The threshold yP, which is de￿ned by L(yP (pL);pL) = F (yP(pL);y￿
F;p￿
F), is a
function of pL. We de￿ne y￿
P ￿ yP(p￿
L), where p￿
L denotes the upstream supplier￿ s value-maximizing
price. We ￿nd:
Proposition 6 In the separated case with two downstream ￿rms, there is a unique equilibrium char-
acterized by:











￿2 r ￿ ￿
￿D
I, (15)













































The intuition for this result is that, in a preemption equilibrium, rent equalization implies that,
for any investment cost chosen upstream, including pL = I, the leader￿ s value is pegged on the follower
payo⁄ F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F). The latter value does not depend on pL (Remark 1). By raising the price pL
above I, the upstream ￿rm increases the cost of leading the sequence of investments, and thereby
raises the preemption equilibrium trigger yP (pL). It also appropriates any additional monetary gain
on top of the constant share ~ L(y;yP (pL);y￿
F;pL) = F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F) retained by the downstream leader.
Therefore, the supplier￿ s value-maximizing strategy is to set yP equal to the investment trigger y￿, as
this trigger maximizes the joint value of the two vertically related units. This is the same investment
trigger as the one chosen by the leader when it incurs the ￿true￿cost I (Remark 2).
The comparison of investment thresholds and input prices, across the single downstream ￿rm and
two-￿rm scenarios, and the integrated case, follows directly from the expressions in (5) and (15-16).















17Proposition 7 In a preemption equilibrium, downstream triggers and upstream prices satisfy the
following rankings:
y￿
P = y￿ < y￿
S < y￿




In the downstream duopoly case, the upstream supplier induces an investment threshold for the
￿rst ￿rm, via the price pL, that is identical to the investment threshold in the integrated case (3.1),
that is y￿, analogously to a ￿no discrimination at the top￿result. The threat of preemption among
downstream ￿rms thus has the e⁄ect of a vertical restraint, insofar as it induces investment at the
correct trigger for the ￿rst ￿rm. The race to be ￿rst exactly counterbalances the incentive that
the leader would otherwise have to delay, if its investment date resulted from the optimization of an
investment threshold. This substitute for a vertical restraint does not represent an industry ￿rst-best




Figure 3: Leader and follower values at current market size y = 1 as a function of investment trigger yi
(with ￿ = 2, I = r ￿ ￿ = ￿M= 2￿D= 1). The preemption trigger y￿
P= y￿ in the separated case
maximizes the integrated leader value (that is, the leader value if pL= I), and is greater than the trigger
under preemption when downstream ￿rms face the true investment cost. By charging p￿
L> I, the upstream
18￿rm appropriates the value di⁄erential ~ L(y;y￿;y￿
F;I)￿~ L(y;y￿;y￿
F;p￿
L). By charging p￿
F> I, it also earns




To illustrate, in Figure 3 the two solid curves refer to the separated case. The quasi concave one
represents ~ L(y;yL;y￿
F;p￿
L), that is the value of the leader as a function of yL, and measured at a
given y (speci￿cally, y = 1) provided that the follower invests at the optimal threshold y￿
F, and for
an upstream value-maximizing price p￿
L (with ￿ = 2, I = r ￿ ￿ = ￿M = 2￿D = 1). The other solid
curve is a graph of F (y;yF;p￿
F), which has the same expression as in (13). Note that, when y = y￿
F,
the leader value is higher since p￿
L = 13
8 < 2 = p￿
F. The preemption threshold y￿
P is determined by the
condition that ￿rms are indi⁄erent at that point between investing as a leader or waiting to invest as
a follower. In this ￿gure, the dashed curve represents the upstream ￿rm￿ s optimization problem. It
describes the reference (or ￿true￿ ) leader value, based on the actual investment cost I (i.e., pL = I)
for all possible yL ￿ y￿
F, and for yF = y￿
F (i.e., pF = p￿
F > I). This is the graph of ~ L(y;yL;y￿
F;I),
which reaches a maximum when yL = y￿.
We also represent the case with two integrated downstream ￿rms (i.e., pL = pF = I). We
know from existing models with similar speci￿cations (e.g., Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux [1], Ma-
son and Weeds [16]) that, in that case, in a preemption equilibrium the leader invests ￿rst at ~ yP,









￿D I. In Figure 3, the two dotted curves represent ~ L(y;yL; ~ yF;I) and F (y;yF;I). It is
straightforward to check that ~ yP < y￿
P < ~ yF < y￿
F.24




















F ￿ I). (18)
This value can be visualized in Figure 3 by reinterpreting each term on the right hand side of
the equality sign in (18) as follows. On the one hand, the supplier chooses pL, shifting the leader
value function, to maximize the di⁄erence between the reservation value that must be given to the
leader and the reference leader value at the preemption trigger yP(pL). By charging exactly p￿
L > I,
so that the leader invests at y￿
P = yP (p￿
L) = y￿, the supplier appropriates the value di⁄erential
~ L(y;y￿;y￿












L ￿ I). (19)
24The comparison of ~ yF with y
￿
S is less straightforward in that it depends on the ratio
￿D
￿M .
19In addition, the upstream supplier earns the di⁄erence between the value that the follower would
earn as an integrated ￿rm, and the value it earns as a separate entity, with yF = y￿
F in both cases.
Formally, by charging p￿
F > I, the supplier appropriates
F (y;y￿









F ￿ I). (20)
The magnitudes (19) and (20) are represented by the vertical arrows in Figure 3.
With respect to ￿rm values, intuition suggests that, in a preemption equilibrium, a downstream
￿rm is worse o⁄, and the upstream ￿rm is better o⁄, than under bilateral monopoly since there is
competition downstream. The ￿rst of these comparisons is not immediate to verify, since the ￿rst
investment occurs at a lower threshold y￿
P < y￿
S, and also faces a lower input price p￿
L < p￿
S, which
is value enhancing. The closed-form expression of y￿
P is useful to resolve this ambiguity, as it allows
us to exactly evaluate the downstream ￿rm value, which we denote by ~ V (y;p￿
L;p￿
F), for all market
sizes y < y￿


































The expression (21) re￿ ects the fact that, ex-ante, a ￿rm is equally likely to be a leader or a follower
under preemption. The comparison of the equilibrium value of the upstream ￿rm ~ W (y;p￿
L;p￿
F) when
there are two downstream buyers, with W (y;p￿
S), is not immediate either. Although the upstream
￿rm sells its input twice, the ￿rst sale is discounted and the second occurs at a more removed date.
Industry value increases under duopoly only conditionally, since although the investment thresh-
old of the ￿rst ￿rm is more e¢ cient, industry ￿ ow pro￿ts decrease with the investment of the second
￿rm. When ￿ is high, which corresponds for example to low volatility of the demand process, the
option component weighs less on ￿rm value than the vertical distortion (see Section 3.3.). The ben-
e￿t gained from correcting the vertical externality by introducing a second ￿rm then outweighs the
destruction of downstream pro￿ts that occurs under duopoly.
Proposition 8 For all y ￿ y￿
P, for all ￿ and all ￿D < ￿M, the downstream value is lower and the
upstream value is higher in a preemption equilibrium than under bilateral monopoly:
~ V (y;p￿
L;p￿
F) < V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S) and W (y;p￿
S) < ~ W (y;p￿
L;p￿
F). (22)





, total industry value is greater in a preemption equilibrium than
under bilateral monopoly.
205.2 Comparative Statics
A noteworthy feature of the speci￿cation with vertical separation and two downstream ￿rms, com-
pared with similar real option games, is that the solution in the preemption scenario is analytic.
The closed-form expression of y￿
P facilitates the comparative statics, which are consistent with the
interpretation of the model given in Section 3.3.
First, we know from Proposition 6 that in the downstream duopoly case the supplier sells the









< 1. We ￿nd that the e⁄ect
on this discount of a higher growth rate ￿ or volatility ￿, and also of a higher pro￿t ratio ￿M
￿D , is
univocal.
















Therefore, the markdown is decreasing in ￿ and ￿M
￿D .
Next, recall from (7-8) that the parameter ￿ is analogous to an elasticity of demand in the
intermediate market, and lower elasticity (greater ￿) results in a greater vertical distortion, with
higher prices and triggers. Although these features are robust to the introduction of a second
















F increasing in ￿, which implies that the net e⁄ect of more growth or volatility on

















that is to say a greater ￿ dampens the price discrimination e⁄ect by decreasing the spread in prices
on the one hand, but also decreases the follower price on the other. The net e⁄ect can be shown to
be negative, but the comparative static in the preemption game is thus not a direct corollary of the
bilateral monopoly case. We ￿nd that changes in market conditions, as captured by the parameter
￿, have a greater impact on the follower input price than the leader input price.
21Proposition 10 In a preemption equilibrium, a higher market growth rate and volatility result in
higher triggers fy￿
P;y￿






L=￿ < 0 and "y￿
F=￿ = "y￿
S=￿ < "y￿
P=￿ < 0. (25)
Finally, the comparative statics of ~ V (y;p￿
L;p￿
F) and ~ W (y;p￿
L;p￿
F), which involve additional e⁄ects
from those of V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S) and W (y;p￿
S), do not appear to have straightforward characterizations.
We ￿nd in particular that ￿ may have either a monotone, or an ambiguous e⁄ect on total industry
value. (See Section 7.9 in the Appendix.)
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have studied investment timing when ￿rms depend on an outside supplier to provide
a discrete input (e.g., a key equipment), developing a dynamic version of a heretofore static model.
The upstream ￿rm￿ s mark-up depends on the stochastic process followed by downstream ￿ ow pro￿ts.
A vertical externality arises because the upstream ￿rm￿ s pricing induces the downstream ￿rm to de-
lay the exercise of its investment option. This distortion, akin to a Lerner index, increases with both
market growth and volatility. Downstream ￿rm values are more sensitive to the market growth rate
than upstream values, and in contrast with the standard real option framework, greater volatility
decreases ￿rm value near the exercise threshold. If the input supplier has su¢ cient information re-
garding downstream demand, it can induce optimal investment timing by means of standard vertical
restraints. Otherwise, the upstream supplier bene￿ts from the presence of a second downstream ￿rm,
which results in a preemption race and acts as a partial substitute for vertical restraints. The input
is then sold to the downstream leader at a discount which increases with volatility, the leader￿ s price
is less sensitive to market growth and volatility than the follower￿ s, and the leader invests at the
optimal threshold, resulting in greater industry pro￿ts when growth and volatility are su¢ ciently
low.
In the ￿rst place, one may allow for upstream competition. If suppliers compete in prices and
there is a single downstream ￿rm, then the integrated optimum is restored. On the other hand,
in an industry with two upstream and two downstream ￿rms, upstream competition presumably
results in a standard preemption race downstream, and the leader invests too early. Second, a strong
qualitative prediction of the model is that, under duopoly, the ￿rst input is sold at a discount. In
22practice, we would expect that learning e⁄ects which decrease the upstream ￿rm￿ s production cost
for the second input supplied, should reduce the apparent discount that is o⁄ered to the leader.
Third, the assumption of a geometric Brownian motion for the stochastic market process can be
relaxed. For example, Poisson jumps may be included to allow for greater risk. Many of the results
here are unchanged, with the exception of those comparative static results that rely on the analytic
expression of ￿. Eventually, the analysis of this paper has adhered to the classical assumption that
the contract terms are decided by the upstream ￿rm. However, one could envisage that it is the
downstream ￿rms that have market power in the input market, and therefore write the contract, or
alternatively that downstream ￿rms may use some other device, such as the threat of reversion to a
tacit collusion equilibrium if such exists.
As stated in the introduction, this paper may be viewed alternatively as an extension of the
existing real options literature, or as the extension of the classic Industrial Organization analysis of
vertical relationships to a stochastic dynamic setting. Although this latter extension involves strong
formal analogies between the static model and the downstream duopoly case, it also uncovers some
signi￿cant di⁄erences. This is clearest in the downstream duopoly case, where under preemption
the upstream supplier treats the leader and follower di⁄erently, and only a partial correction of the
vertical externality is feasible given the sequence of actions. Finally, besides shedding light on an
incentive for dynamic price discrimination, the model presented here makes several predictions with
respect to decision timing and ￿rm values which only await empirical testing on a suitable set of
data.
7 Appendix
7.1 Sensitivity of ￿ to ￿ and ￿
The derivatives of ￿ with respect to the growth and volatility parameters ￿ and ￿ arise throughout






















￿3 ￿ 0: (27)
23With respect to the signs of these expressions, note that by assumption that 1
2 ￿ ￿
￿2 < 0, and r ￿ ￿￿,
with equality only if ￿ = 0.
7.2 Sensitivity of y￿
S and p￿










































































7.3 Behavior of f (￿)









. This expression arises several times throughout the paper. To










. Since lim￿!1 (￿ ￿ 1)
￿￿1 = 1,
f(1) = 1. To establish that lim￿!1 f(￿) = 2

























































￿2(￿￿1)2 < 0 and lim￿!1
￿





247.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on V ￿ and W￿ follows directly from the expressions displayed in the
main body of the paper, so that we need focusing on ￿ only. We ￿rst sign dV ￿
d￿ . After simpli￿cation,



































































￿2 ￿(r ￿ ￿) > 0. When ￿ =
r ￿ z, ￿ = 1, and therefore g (z;z;￿) = 1
2 + z














d￿ > 0 for all admissible parameter values.
Next, we sign dW￿

























































￿2 ￿ (r ￿ ￿) > 0. Taking ￿ = r ￿ z,
h(z;z;￿) = 0, and
dh(￿;r;￿)






￿￿￿1 > 0. Therefore,
dW(y;p￿
S)
d￿ > 0 for all
admissible parameter values.
It remains to rank "V ￿=￿ and "W￿=￿. A simple reorganization of terms in (29) and (31), together
with 1
￿ < 1
￿￿1, directly leads to "W￿=￿ < "V ￿=￿. ￿
7.5 Proof of Proposition 6
The optimal follower investment threshold y￿
F and second spot price p￿
F having been discussed in the
text, only the ￿rst spot price p￿
L and the preemption threshold y￿
P remain to be established.
25First, we determine the upstream ￿rm￿ s strategy space to be of the form [0;p]. The value function
F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F) is increasing and convex and L(y;pL) is increasing and concave in y. The choice of pL
is bounded because the equation L(y;pL) = F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F) must have at least one root in y, given pL,






dy , we ￿nd






F. Note that y < y￿
F so long as ￿D < ￿M. Then,
p is de￿ned implicitly by L(y;p) = F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F):
Second, for pL 2 [0;p], a preemption equilibrium exists at the threshold yP (pL) that veri￿es
L(yP (pL);pL) = F (yP (pL);y￿
F;p￿
F). Speci￿cally, yP (pL) is de￿ned implicitly by:
￿M
r ￿ ￿














I = 0. (33)
The decision problem of the upstream ￿rm can then be examined. Its value when the current market














F ￿ I). (34)




































F) = V (y;yP;I) + U (y;p￿
F), (36)
where U (y;p￿
F) is independent of yP, and V (y;yP;I) is the integrated payo⁄ (1) of Section 3.1. The
upstream ￿rm￿ s decision problem is thus that of the integrated ￿rm, and the ￿rst-order condition

























































































￿. In addition, it can
be veri￿ed that y￿










F are given under the assumption of price-taking by downstream ￿rms, only
the parameters of L(y;pL) and F (y;y￿
F;p￿
F) are altered (speci￿cally, the investment cost which is
26asymmetric for the ￿rst and second ￿rm to invest), so Fudenberg and Tirole [9]￿ s argument applies
to establish that downstream ￿rms seek to invest immediately o⁄ the equilibrium path if no ￿rm has
entered yet when the market size reaches y￿
P. ￿
7.6 Proof of Proposition 8





















































I < 0. (38)


























￿D > 1. After simpli￿cation, ~ W (y;p￿
L;p￿
F) > W (y;p￿






















+ ￿ + 1 > 0. (40)

















































￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ f (￿)
f (￿)
> 0,






27The industry value with two ￿rms is:
2~ V (y;p￿
L;p￿

























After simpli￿cation, 2~ V (y;p￿
L;p￿
F) + ~ W (y;p￿
L;p￿
F) > V (y;y￿
S;p￿
S) + W (y;p￿







































f(￿) > 1 and lim￿!1
1
f(￿) = e
2 (section 7.3), (43) holds for ￿ and ￿M
￿D large enough. More-







































￿ 1, and lim￿!1 ￿(￿;
1+￿
￿￿1) = ￿1 < 0. ￿
7.7 Proof of Proposition 9














< 0 for all ￿M > ￿D in the proof of Propo-


















￿D ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿i
.
The sign of d￿
d￿ is that of the expression in square brackets. The derivative of this expression with
respect to ￿M












, which is negative for all ￿ > 1 and ￿M ￿ ￿D.
Then take ￿M
￿D = 1 for a lower bound, which is ￿ln
￿
￿￿1 < 0. It follows that d￿
d￿ < 0. ￿
7.8 Proof of Proposition 10
For the comparative statics, note that the functional form of the triggers y￿
P and y￿
F is similar to
that of y￿
S, and that p￿
F = p￿
S. The calculations are similar to those of the bilateral monopoly case of
Section 7.2. To show that
dp￿
L



















d￿ as a function of ￿M












d￿ is quasiconcave in ￿M





















































7.9 Sensitivity of Firm Values to ￿ under Preemption
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